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RECENT DECISIONS
although conceding that he is generally liable for his torts,9 to protect
himself under the plea of infancy. 10 However, the court recognizes
the undue hardship on defendant but feels itself remediless. It
points out that the relief must come through legislation and that in a
number of states such remedial statutes have already been enacted."
A. A. M.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON NONRESIDENT-RESI-

DOMIcILE CONsTRuED.-Defendant has his home, which
he owns and in which his family dwells, in Virginia. He owns no
property either real or personal in New York. The defendant was
a frequent visitor of this city and while here lived in the same room
in the same hotel, staying at times as long as three weeks. On July
8, 1933, plaintiff issued a summons against the defendant, while
latter party was not in town but who did return for three days in
August, commencing August 21st. On August 30, 1933, an order
was signed for substituted service of summons, which service was
duly made and defendant appears specially to set such service aside.
Held, defendant not a resident within the contemplation of the statute authorizing issuance of an order for substituted service.1
Rawstorne v. Maguire,2 240 App. Div. 1, 269 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st
Dept. 1934).
Substituted service of process has no effect in giving a court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, unless the person is
DENCE AND

domiciled in the state wherein the order was procured. 3
'Supra note 2.

0Ibid.;

1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921)

§245.

" Iowa, Kan., Utah, Wash.
'IN. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1920) §230. This section permits an order
for substituted service to be issued, where defendant is "a natural person
residing within the state" when satisfactory proof is given the plaintiff cannot
be served within the state, due diligence being exercised.
' Martin, J., dissents in opinion; Glennon, J., concurs in dissent.
'De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890). The court
states that a court may acquire jurisdiction by substituted service over both
person and property of a person domiciled within its jurisdiction in the matter
provided for in the lex fori. "But a court has no extra-territorial jurisdiction,
and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in
personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or
process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court
by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted
against him." 120 N. Y. at 495, 24 N. E. at 999. Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun
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A person can have only one domicile, but as many residences
as his means permit.4 The domicile is where a person lives, intending to make it his fixed home. 5 Residence is mere bodily presence
in a given place, as an inhabitant.6 One's domicile may be in one
place and his residence in another.7 In order to effectuate a change
of domicile, it is essential that a new residence be taken and an intention is had to remain there, making that place home, and the
place of citizenship"
In certain instances, "residence" and "domicile" have been con578 (N. Y. 1884) ; Sweeney v. Nat'l Assets Corp., 139 Misc. 223, 246 N. Y.
Supp. 315 (1930).
In Johnson v. Diamond, 208 App. Div. 639, 203 N. Y. Supp. 895 (1st
Dept. 1924), defendant was a traveling salesman with no fixed domicile. Substituted service was permitted to be made on him by affixing a copy of the
summons to the door of the room he was then occupying in this state.
In Leighty v. Tichenor, 173 App. Div. 228, 159 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1st Dept.
1916), the court, in construing Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) §1760, which is similar
to note 1 supra, says: "* * * It appears to us from a consideration of the
statutes that the intent of the statute was to prescribe a method of service on
domiciled and not merely temporary residents, and that, therefore, by the terms
of the statute as well as by the principles of the common law, the service would
be ineffective if defendant was not at the time domiciled in Missouri, even
though he happened to have a temporary 'place of abode' in the state." 173
App. Div. at 231, 159 N. Y. Supp. at 459.
In Rawstorne v. Maguire, instant case, Martin, J., in his dissenting opinion,
makes the statement that even if the defendant is domiciled in another state,
he is not precluded from being a resident of New York and as such is amenable
to substituted service of process.
'Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed. 554 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918); Bischoff v. Bischoff, 88 App. Div. 126, 85 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dept.
1903); U. S. Trust Co. v. Hart, 150 App. Div. 413, 135 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1st
Dept. 1912); In re Rooney, 172 App. Div. 274, 159 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3rd
Dept. 1916); In re Lydig's Estate, 191 App. Div. 117, 180 N. Y. Supp. 843
(1st Dept. 1920); In re Green's Estate, 99 Misc. 582, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1063
(1917), aff'd, 179 App. Div. 890, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1088 (lst Dept. 1917); It re
Stone's Estate, 135 Misc. 736, 240 N. Y. Supp. 398 (1929) ; In re Beechwood,
142 Misc. 400, 254 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1931) ; In re Wendel's Estate, 144 Misc.
467, 259 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1932).
'Mitchell v. United States, 88 U. S. 350 (1874) ; In re Newcomb's Estate,
192 N. Y. 238, 84 N. E. 950 (1908), aff'g, 122 App. Div. 920, 107 N. Y. Supp.
1139 (1907).
'Supra note 5.

'Frost and Dickinson v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11 (N. Y. 1837) ; It re Grant's
Estate, 83 Misc. 257, 144 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1913); In re Curtis, 178 N. Y.
Supp. 286 (1919).
'Mitchell v. United States, supra note 5; Sun Printing Co. v. Edwards,
194 U. S. 383, 24 Sup. Ct. 696 (1904) ; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619,
34 Sup. Ct. 442 (1914); Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S. 561, 35 Sup. Ct. 164
(1915).
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strued to be synonymous, 9 as in the case at bar, and in other instances, the courts have held them to be diverse.' 0
V. G. R.

TRUSTS---SoLE RISK" OF CORPORATE TRUSTEE.-The

appellant

bank was a trustee under a trust deed that permitted it to invest in
certain so-called "non-legals." It invested in its own mortgage participations, two of which did not mature till after the period for
which the trust was limited. When the trust period expired, the
beneficiary was offered the participations which, owing to conditions
surrounding the real estate market, were worthless. He brought
suit, claiming that the investments were imprudently and negligently
made and that the bank guaranteed its investments under the New
York Banking Law.' Held, that the investments were not impru'Residence and domicile are generally construed as synonymous when used
in the Constitution or in statutes relating to voting, eligibility for office, jurisdiction in divorce, probate and administration. Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S.
529, 11 Sup. Ct. 414 (1891); De Meli v. De Meli, supra note 3; Bell v. Pierce,
51 N. Y. 12 (1872) ; see Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Ives, 21 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 67, 3 N. Y. Supp. 895 (1889).
Eligibility for office: People v. Platt, 117 N. Y. 159, 22 N. E. 936 (1889).
Matrimonial actions: De Meli v. De Meli, supra note 3. Matter of succession
and transfer taxes: In re Martin's Estate, 173 App. Div. 1, 158 N. Y. Supp.
915 (1st Dept. 1916) ; In re Wise's Estate, 146 N. Y. Supp. 789 (1914). Venue:
Klenrock v. Nantex Manufacturing Co., 201 App. Div. 236, 194 N. Y. Supp.
142 (2d Dept. 1922); cf. Johnson v. Hoile, 205 App. Div. 633, 199 N. Y. Supp.
875 (2d Dept. 1923). Contra: Lyon v. Lyon, 30 Hun 455 (N. Y. 1883). In
this case, at page 456, the court says: "The section of the code referred to
(§984 C. C. P. now §182 C. P. A.) makes the residence of the parties the
controlling fact in fixing the place of trial. This means actual residence and
not necessarily the domicile of one of the parties."
""Residence in attachment laws generally implies an established abode,
fixed permanently for a time, for business or other purposes, although there
may be an intent existing all the while to return to the true domicile." Weitkamp v. Weitkamp, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 79 at 82-3 (1886). Hislop v. Taaffe,
141 App. Div. 40, 125 N. Y. Supp. 614 (2d Dept. 1910); Zenatello v. Pons, 235
App. Div. 221, 256 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1st Dept. 1932).
'N. Y. BANING LAw (1933) §188, subd. 7. "All investments of money
received by any such corporation, and by any trust company * * * as * * *
testamentary trustee * * * shall be at its sole risk, and for all losses of such
money the capital stock, property and effects of the corporation shall be absolutely liable, unless the investments are such as are proper when made by an
individual acting as trustee * * * or such as are permitted in and by the instrument or words creating or defining the trust. Investments in bond and mortgage by any such corporation as * * * testamentary trustee * * * may be made
by apportioning or by transferring to any estate or fund so held a part interest
in a bond and mortgage held by or in the name of such corporation * * * •
but such bond and mortgage shall be a legal investment for trustees under the
laws of this state * * *."

